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Abstract
This paper applies the general insights of liberalization of the electricity and gas 
market to the market conditions of a particularly important new Member State in 
the EU, Poland. To this end the aim of this paper is to explain the Polish experience 
of liberalizing its energy market by reviewing those developments that produced 
its current shape. In fact there are two possible scenarios Polish policy makers 
can follow in liberalizing its energy sector. One would involve the UK approach 
that encompasses: ownership unbundling, less market concentration, less public 
ownership and more private capital in the industry. The second scenario follows 
the continental model: more concentration and vertical integration and more State 
or public ownership in the energy field (for instance, the French model). These two 
widely diverging approaches reflect different energy consumption patterns, energy 
mixes, sources of supply and natural resources of various countries. Having these 
differences in mind this research reviews developments that have produced the 
current state of liberalization of the electricity and gas sectors in Poland and discusses 
the prospects for further progress towards an integrated, competitive and liberalized 
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European electricity and gas market in the light of the challenges that remain. These 
challenges include uneven unbundling, discriminatory third party access, insufficient 
independency of national regulator, consolidation and anti-competitive behaviour of 
incumbents or abuse of one’s dominant position on the market.
Classifications and key words: electricity, gas, liberalization, competition, 
unbundling, third party access, regulation.
I. Introduction 
An electricity and gas market fully open to competition is a unique mission, 
it is very hard to achieve, but certainly not impossible. Continued supply is 
crucial with respect to electricity, and for many customers, also gas. Undeniably, 
a guarantee of secure and reliable supplies of gas and electricity at reasonable 
prices constitutes an essential public service. However, the supply of energy 
is dependent on transmission and distribution infrastructure which is very 
costly to construct. Moreover, the fact that the return on investment (ROI) 
in networks, storage capacities or Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) terminals is 
calculated on a long-terms basis often discourages potential private investors. 
The construction and operation of networks is thus left to natural monopolies 
which then have the incentive to use their dominant position, for instance, 
to deny access to infrastructure in order to slow down market opening. 
Independent regulation, which aims to secure non-discriminatory third party 
access to infrastructure, is therefore essential as a surrogate for competition in 
network activities. Finally, electricity and gas used to be supplied by only one, 
or very few, vertically integrated undertakings (VIU) controlling the entire 
electricity/gas distribution chain (from generation to supply) in almost all EU 
Member States. This model can be generally associated with high production 
costs and artificially low prices supplemented by cross-subsidization and State-
subsidies. As a result, competition was absent and national markets segmented. 
Legislation, regulation and market-design are commonly associated with 
national governments, EU institutions, independent regulators, independent 
system operators and private interest groups. They should play a significant, if 
not the main, role in the development of liberalized and competitive national 
electricity and gas markets. 
The liberalization of the electricity and gas sectors across the EU constitutes 
a major part of its Internal Energy Market strategy whereby the rules of a single 
market are extended to network industries. Alongside transport, telecoms 
and postal services, the energy sector is part of the general EU liberalization 
policy, which started in the mid 1980s and lead to the issuance of a substantial 
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amount of secondary legislation. Especially relevant in this context are the 
2003 Directive concerning common rules for the internal market in electricity 
(Electricity Directive) and the 2003 Directive concerning common rules on 
the internal market in natural gas (Gas Directive)1. The purpose of these two 
acts was to restructure the European electricity and gas sectors by: unbundling 
vertically integrated activities of electricity and gas conglomerates; reducing 
their horizontal concentration; introducing competition in wholesale energy 
generation markets and retail supply; monitoring transmission and distribution 
networks and; establishing independent regulators.
The main rules on internal energy markets contained in the directives were 
transposed into the Polish Energy Act on 3 May 20052. Unfortunately, some 
concerns remain about the compatibility of some of the domestic provisions 
with the directives. For example, the existing gas transmission system operator 
(TSO) does not seem to be properly unbundled yet. So far, it focuses on 
adapting its operations to Poland’s relatively inefficient production and 
transmission structure, rather than on modifying its structure, which would in 
turn facilitate an open and competitive market. Distribution system operators 
(DSOs) in both electricity and gas have also not been functionally and legally 
unbundled to the required degree. This gives them the means to discriminate 
against other market players, especially new entrants, in favor of their own 
supply companies. Another source of constraint lies in Polish regulation itself. 
Until the mid 1990s, regulation was a foreign concept for Polish organizational 
and legal theory and practice. Polish policy-makers saw regulation as an 
unwanted development, considering independent regulators to be a threat to 
their authority. 
Moreover, the circumstances surrounding the establishment of a Polish 
energy regulator substantially differed from the creation of its telecoms 
counterpart. In the mid 1990s, little reason existed to set up a telecoms 
authority since the sector was monopolised by the State owned landline 
operator. With the growth of mobile phones and the privatization of the 
incumbent, the need to establish a sector-specific regulator became clear. 
According to Majone and Surdej, Poland needed a telecoms regulator in order 
to control the incumbent and to ensure non-discriminatory conditions of third 
1 Directive 2003/54/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2003 
concerning common rules for the internal market in electricity (OJ [2003] L 176/37); Directive 
2003/55/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2003 concerning common 
rules for the internal market in natural gas (OJ [2003] L 176/57).
2 Journal of Laws 2005, No. 62, item 552). The Energy Act regulates rules determining 
national energy policy, rules and conditions of supply and consumption of energy, fuels and heat, 
as well as rules and conditions of operation of energy companies and indicates the authorities 
responsible for matters relating to energy and fuels.
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party access to its facilities3. By contrast, the need to regulate the energy sector 
did not arise due to technical improvements. Instead, it resulted from planned 
organizational and ownership changes (privatization) of the industry as well 
as new economic and organizational theories, which helped demonstrate that 
the energy market could be divided into a competitive and a monopolistic 
segment.
II. Polish energy market in a nutshell
Although the Polish energy sector is not fully liberalized yet, every household 
is theoretically free to choose from which producer or supplier it wishes to 
purchases its energy. At the time of Poland’s EU accession, 51% of its energy 
market was liberalized4. In reality however, the Polish energy sector is still domi-
nated by its former monopolists. The electricity market is dominated by four 
conglomerates controlling the entire electricity distribution chain from genera-
tion to supply. The situation of the gas sector is similar. Polskie Górnictowo Naf-
towe i Gazownictwo S.A. (PGNiG SA), established in 1976 as a fully vertically 
integrated State owned monopoly responsible for the entire gas distribution 
chain, continues to be the largest, as well as the only Polish, company operating 
in oil and gas exploration5, production, processing, storage, and trade6. 
Due to the requirements set out in the Electricity and Gas Directives in 
relation to the unbundling of VIUs7 (as transposed into Article 9d of the Polish 
Energy Act), transmission has been separated, legally and functionally8, from 
the competitive activities of energy generation and supply. Nevertheless, PGNiG 
3 See G. Majone, A. Surdej, “Regulatory Agencies in Economic Governance. The Polish case 
in a comparative perspective”(2006) 5 KICES working papers. Koszalin Institute of Comparative 
Administrative Studies 27.
4 M. Olejnik, “National Approaches to implementation – Poland” [in:] P. Cameron (ed.), 
Legal Aspects of EU Energy Regulation. Implementing the New Directives on Electricity and Gas 
Across Europe, Oxford 2005, p. 405.
5 Exploration and production operations of the PGNiG SA are being conducted on the 
Mining and Geological Laws, and as such are not covered by the Energy Act.
6 See PGNiG SA web page at: www.pgnig.pl 
7 See Article 9d of the Energy Act (Journal of Laws 2006 No. 89, item 625), as amended by 
the Act 2006 which transpose Directives. According to this Article there has to be a separation 
between the management of the TSO or DSO on the one hand and the management structure 
of the integrated energy undertakings on the other.
8 The core of functional or managerial unbundling is that system operators have effective and 
independent decision-making rights as well as independent management structures, especially 
regarding access to the networks. Legal unbundling, in contrast, requires that a separate legal 
undertaking be created, a legal entity or personality in which all activities different from 
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SA is still involved in transmission through its subsidiary, the TSO Gaz System. 
PGNiG SA is also involved in the distribution and supply of gas, a fact that 
effectively blocks competition in this market in violation of the Gas Directive. 
Moreover, Polish authorities have delayed the restructuring of the gas 
market choosing instead to focus on electricity. The Ministry of Economy 
clearly stated that the liberalization of the gas market will be postponed until 
20109, a delay not permitted by the Gas Directive. So far, Poland has not 
informed the Commission about its plans concerning its gas market for the 
potentially transitory period leading up to 2010. The Ministry has merely 
asserted that Poland wants to diversify its gas supplies before addressing 
the issue of making its gas market more competitive. This claim is mistaken 
however, since competition facilitates the diversification of supplies and thus, 
enhances the security of supply.
With regard to unbundling, Article 324–325 of the Energy Act distinguishes 
between TSOs and DSOs. Article 326–328 concerns gas storage operators, LNG 
operators and combined operators. The role of system operators is central to 
electricity and gas markets. They are the only entities permitted to carry out 
transmission, distribution or storage activities – they must obtain a license 
from the Energy Regulatory Office (Urząd Regulacji Energetyki - URE), to 
carry out their business10. TSOs are mainly responsible for the transmission11 
of energy in Poland, while DSOs are responsible for the transmission and 
distribution12 in stipulated regions of Poland, as indicated in their licenses. 
System operators are obliged to grant access to their networks to all 
suppliers and traders, based on third party access rules set out in the Electricity 
and Gas Directives. Article 9 of the Polish Energy Act delegates the power 
to issue access tariff decrees to the Ministry responsible for the economy. 
Consequently, system operators must grant access in accordance with the 
generation and supply (namely, transmission or distribution) are conducted. For more on this 
see B. Nowak, Wewnętrzny Rynek Energii w Unii Europejskiej, Warszawa 2009.
 9 See Commissions Staff Working Document. Implementation Report – SEC(2006) 
1709, page 136. Accompanying document to the Communication from the Commission to the 
Council and the European Parliament – Prospects for the internal gas and electricity market 
– COM(2006) 841 final. Available at:  http://ec.europa.eu/energy/energy_policy/doc/10_internal_
market_country_reviews_en.pdf 
10 See Articles 32–43 of the Energy Act.
11 Total number of electricity transmission networks (750 kV-only for connecting Polish 
electricity system with Ukraine, currently not used, 400 kV and 220 kV) in Poland is counted to 
be 13 thousands km. Additionally due to insufficiency in capacity and technological developments 
the distribution networks are used for the transmission purposes that is 110 kV lines, estimated 
at 32,5 thousands km. Transmission gas networks amount to 18,6 thousands km. See Program 
Operacyjny Infrastruktura i Środowisko, Warszawa 29 listopada 2006; p.4.
12 Distribution electricity networks lower than 110 kV amount to 705 thousands km. 
Distribution gas networks amount to 123 thousands km.
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general terms and tariffs approved by URE concerning the sale, transmission 
or distribution agreements between transmission/distribution operators and 
suppliers or traders. In the transmission segment, system operators themselves 
set tariffs; in the distribution segment, which is not really unbundled, vertically 
integrated distribution companies set their own tariffs. System operators can 
refuse access but only under certain, justified conditions such as serious 
financial or technical inadequacies or issues relating to the security of supply. 
Every refusal must be reasoned. The regulator reviews refusals acting in the 
capacity as a dispute-settlement body13. System operators are responsible for 
the security and condition of the electricity and gas networks14.
III. Unbundling of transmission system operators 
Poland has established two TSOs – one for the electricity market (PSE–
Operator) and one for gas (Gaz-System). The directives did not envisage 
derogation periods or exemptions from the unbundling requirements for 
TSOs. PSE-Operator was unbundled legally and functionally on 1 July 2004 
by its parent company PSE SA (currently part of Polska Grupa Energetyczna 
– PGE). Gaz-System, the only gas TSO in Poland, was established on 16 April 
2004 by its parent company PGNiG SA. Originally, 100% of its shares were 
held by its parent company. However, on 28 April 2005, PGNiG SA donated 
them to the Polish Ministry of Treasury.15 As a result, the Treasury maintains 
direct control over the natural gas transmission system in Poland, even though 
around 40% of the transmission networks and other connected facilities is still 
owned by PGNiG SA16. However, PGNiG SA is effectively also controlled 
by the Treasury, which holds 85% of its shares. Gaz-System has been legally 
unbundled since 1 July 2005. 
To ensure competition, market opening and the proper functioning of 
the European internal energy market, system operators must have effective 
and independent decision-making rights as well as independent management 
structures, especially with respect to network access. In other words, system 
13 Article 8 of the Energy Act.
14  Secure and proper maintenance involves: the ongoing long-term operational security 
of the system, the use, maintenance and repair and necessary expansion of the distribution or 
transmission networks, including connections to other gas or electricity systems. See for instance 
Article 324 and 325 of the Polish Energy Act.
15 For more on this see Gaz-System web page at: http://www.gaz-system.pl/page?mid=10 
16 The 60 % has been recently donated through the Ministry of Treasury to the Gaz-System. 
See for more on this on portal CIRE.PL - Gaz System odkupi gazociągi? Available at: http://
www.cire.pl/item,29628,1.html 
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operators should be independent from other activities not directly related 
to transmission or distribution. This is of particular significance to Poland 
where Gaz-System leases, rather than owns, the entire network infrastructure. 
This arrangement effectively makes the TSO an affiliate of PGNiG SA even 
thought they were theoretically unbundled both in the legal and functional 
sense. The following case study will demonstrate that having VIUs present in 
the supply and/or generation chain as well as directly or indirectly involved in 
transmission, raises serious doubts about their non-discriminatory behavior. 
At the end of 2006, Gaz-System denied pipeline access to the trading 
company Emfesz Polska (Hungarian origin). Access was needed in this case to 
fulfil Emfesz’s contractual obligations to transport 150 million cubic meters of 
gas from the Polish border to the largest Polish fertilizer producer (ZA Pulawy). 
The grounds for the denial were vague. Gaz-System claimed, in favour of PGNiG 
SA, that Emfesz did not have adequate storage capacity in Poland17 in order 
to secure trade (all storage belongs to PGNiG SA). Moreover, according to 
PGNiG SA, it needed the entire Polish storage capacity for its own operation18. 
As a result, Emfesz lodged a complaint to the Polish Office of Competition and 
Consumer Protection (Urząd Ochrony Konkurencji i Konsumenta, UOKiK). 
However, the UOKiK President upheld the decision of Gaz-System. Emfesz 
took the case to the EU and is now awaiting decision. The Emfesz case highlights 
several important legal issues concerning the Polish energy sector.
First, access to storage is regulated according to Article 19 of the Gas 
Directive, stating that access procedures shall operate in accordance with 
objective, transparent and non-discriminatory criteria (Article 19(2)). Since 
there is no need to un-bundle storage (only separation of accounts), PGNiG 
is left in charge of the entire Polish storage capacity rather than transferring 
it to TSOs (be it Gaz-System or other independent storage operators). In 
light of PGNiG’s dominant position, Emfesz has not been able to gain access. 
This fact might constitute a breach of Article 19 of the Gas Directive. PGNiG 
disagreed, claiming that it needed the entire available capacity for its own use. 
In fact, it saw the existing capacity as indispensable for its own operations and, 
since it was very limited, it clamed that the existing Polish storage capacity was 
not sufficient for sharing. 
17 Recently Emfesz has found another solution to the obstacles set forth by the PGNiG. 
Namely the company had bought underground gas resources (Antonin in Poland) of 
approximately 120 million cubic meters of which 80 million cubic meters has been already 
exploited. Emfesz after exploiting the remaining 40 million cubic meters, plans to use the 
underground resources as the gas storage facilities. For more on this see “Emfesz zarzucił 
w Polsce mocną kotwicę” – available at portal CIRE: http://www.cire.pl/item,29706,1.html 
18 See “New Gas Reserve Act gives PGNIG even stronger control over the Polish market” 
Gas Matters, May 2007, p. 18, Platts.
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In addition, PGNiG argues that it cannot make its storage capacity available 
to third parties due to the Act on fuel reserves19, which forces the company to 
store larger quantities of gas in order to secure an adequate reserve in case of 
national emergencies. The Act requires every trading company that annually 
supplies above 50 million cubic meters of imported gas, to have a storage 
capacity in Poland and to maintain a 30-day reserve of gas. Companies that 
import less than 50 million cubic meters per year and have less than 100,000 
customers are exempt from this requirement. Each year, PGNiG produces 
around 3.9 billion cubic meters of gas and imports around 7.9 billion cubic 
meters from Russia. At present, its storage capacity is only about 2 billion 
cubic meters. If PGNiG’s argument was accepted, one would have to ask: 
Why have the Polish authorities adopted the Act on fuel reserves in the first 
place (with the aim to store gas on Polish territory) if it was clear that it would 
become a dead law due to the lack of storage capacity. In fact, even though 
PGNiG already controlled around 95% of the Polish gas market, the Act on 
fuel reserves made it possible for PGNiG to also control its competitors, for 
instance, by denying access to storage. 
Second, the Emfesz case highlights also the fact that a denial of access to 
the transmission system may constitute a breach of Article 1(1) of the gas-
regulation20 (which states: “This Regulation aims at setting non-discriminatory 
rules for access conditions to natural gas transmission systems (…)”). Thus, 
Gaz–System’s denial of system access constitutes discriminatory behaviour on 
the part of a TSO, acting in favour of its parent company (PGNiG SA) which 
is, in turn, the main gas trader in Poland. 
Third, it might be inferred that the behaviour of Gaz–System indicates that 
it was informally granted preferential capacity for cross-border transmission 
and storage of gas (as the only gas TSO), If that was true, Poland would be 
in violation of the ECJ Judgment of 7 June 2005(C-17/03)21 which deems 
preferential access to historical long-term supply contracts and capacity 
reservations contracts to be discriminatory and thus, in violation of Directive 
2003/54/EC and Regulation 1228/2003. Although this judgement concerns 
electricity, it could be easily applied to contracts granting preferential 
transmission, distribution and storage in other segments of the energy sector 
– in the case at hand, natural gas. If so, Poland would be in violation of 
Directive 2003/55/EC and Regulation 1775/2005. Still, as a dominant market 
19 Act from 16 February 2007 on Reserves of Oil, Oil Products, Natural Gas and on 
Procedures in Case of Emergency in Security of Fuel Supply and Disturbance on Oil Market 
(Journal of Laws No. 52, item 343).
20 Regulation (EC) No. 1775/2005 of the European Parliament and Council of 28 September 
2005 on conditions for access to the natural gas transmission networks, OJ [2005] L 289/1.
21 OJ [2005] C 182/2.
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player, Gaz–System may argue that it has denied access to Emfesz because 
it must fulfil its public service obligations by protecting the security of supply 
or because it was concerned about the economic and financial difficulties 
associated with take-or-pay contracts. However, such refusal would be subject 
to derogation by the competent national regulatory authority as well as 
confirmation of the Commission, neither of which took place in this case. 
Moreover, it is hard to believe that supplying 150 million cubic meters of gas 
to a single company would threaten the security of the nation’s supply. 
Finally, PGNiG, or more precisely, the Ministry of Treasure as its owner, 
might be thought to have breached Article 31 EC. Under this Article, Member 
States are obliged to intervene to ensure that State monopolies of a commercial 
nature do not discriminate against companies from other EU Member States 
regarding the conditions under which goods are bought and sold. In a case 
comparable to the above, the Commission issued a formal request under 
Article 226 EC asking Malta to intervene in the actions of its monopoly over 
the import, storage and wholesale of petroleum products. Malta, according to 
Commissioner Kroes, had been maintaining discriminatory measures favouring 
its own commercial state monopoly, which blocked potential new entrants 
from entering Malta’s wholesale petroleum market22. 
The fact that suppliers must negotiate with their competitors in order 
to contract their storage needs must be seen as a serious barrier for new 
entrants, undermining confidence in the market. As a result, even though 
it is not necessary to un-bundle storage, an obligation to separate storage 
operators would certainly enable competitors and regulators to verify whether 
all available storage capacity is offered on the market on transparent terms. 
In addition to its legal consequences, the Emfesz case has political 
implications. Polish authorities oppose liberalizing the gas sector because 
doing so will boost the prices of subsidised gas and leave the Polish gas 
market open to influences by companies such as Emfesz, which has close 
ties to the Russian companies Gazprom and RosUkroEnergo. This concern 
might be partly eliminated by the third country clause – an amendment to 
the Electricity and Gas Directives contained in the third legislative package 
on EU internal electricity & gas markets. The package contains safeguards to 
ensure that in the event that companies from third countries wish to acquire 
a significant interest, or even control, over an EU network, they will have to 
clearly and unequivocally comply with the same unbundling requirements as 
EU companies. The Commission can intervene where a purchaser cannot 
22 For more on this see IP/07/958 from June 2007 on Commission requests Malta to adjust 
import monopoly for petroleum products. Available at: http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.
do?reference=IP/07/958&format=HTML&aged=1&language=EN&guiLanguage=en 
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demonstrate both its direct and indirect independence from supply and 
generation activities. 
Even when unbundling is conducted with regard to independent decision-
making, or separate accounting and bookkeeping procedures, the threat 
remains that a TSO will remain informally dependent on its parent company. 
Experience shows that three types of problems arise where a TSO/DSO forms 
part of a VIU. First, system operators often treat their affiliated companies 
better than competing third parties, for instance, by using network assets to 
make entry more difficult for competitors. Second, non-discriminatory access 
to information cannot be guaranteed since there is no effective tool to prevent 
a TSO/DSO from releasing sensitive market information to the generation or 
supply branch of a VIU. Third, investment incentives within VIU are distorted 
since vertically integrated system operators have no reason to develop their 
network in the interests of all market players. Such situation has a negative 
influence on the competitiveness of the Polish energy sector as well as its 
security of supply, especially in terms of infrastructure. Therefore, ownership 
unbundling seems to be the best solution to end discriminatory practices. 
Ownership unbundling should give rise to a situation where the same person 
(e.g. a pension fund) can only hold non-controlling minority interests (for 
instance up to 10% of shares) in a TSO/DSO and a supply undertaking. 
Moreover, minority shareholders should not be able to hold blocking rights 
in both undertakings nor appoint members of their managerial boards nor 
have a representative in the boards of both entities. This way, the inherent 
conflict of interests would diminish. 
However, as a key amendment proposed in the Commission’s third energy 
package, ownership unbundling remains a controversial issue. According to 
the Commission and Member States such as the UK and the Netherlands, 
the most radical form of ownership unbundling would increase competition 
and clear the path for a greater level of sustainability and supply security23. 
On the other hand, ownership unbundling is strongly opposed by the affected 
companies, such as E.ON and RWE or EDF and GDF, as well as by Germany 
and France24. These two countries, in light of the specific structure and strong 
23 For more on this see third legislative package
24 In fact the Commission’s proposal of ownership unbundling has been criticized by 8 
countries: France, Germany, Austria, Bulgaria, Latvia, Luxembourg, Slovakia and Greece. The 
8 countries in a letter to the European Commission and the chairwomen of the European 
Parliament’s ITRE committee published in January 2008 (for more on this see Goldberg S., 
“Recent developments in the European Union energy sector” (2008) European Energy Review 
published by Herbert Smith LLP in association with Gleiss Lutz and Stibbe ) gave several main 
reasons for their opposition to ownership unbundling. They argue that ownership unbundling: 
i) may not be compatible with the relevant constitutional laws and the free movement of capital 
across the EU, ii) dose not respect the principle of proportionality as they argue other solutions 
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national orientation of their energy sectors, have chosen to advocate a third 
way on ownership unbundling – an independent system operator – sometimes 
referred to as the Scottish model. In Scotland, the two dominant energy 
companies continue to own electricity infrastructure but the transmission lines 
are leased and run by National Grid, an independent group that runs the 
infrastructure of UK’s gas and electricity networks. This model could offer 
a compromise between those calling for big energy groups to be carved up and 
those advocating less radical action such as France or Germany.
IV. Unbundling of distribution system operators 
The situation in the distribution segment of the Polish energy sector is 
more complicated than in transmission. Distribution companies are dominant 
in their respective geographic regions. New traders occasionally enter the 
market but they are generally linked to one of the main generators. According 
to Polish officials, DSOs have been functionally and legally unbundled. In 
reality, most DSOs are part of distribution supply companies (which have 
no production/generation capacity, though most of them are linked to major 
electricity generating companies). Only recently has a moderate change in that 
structure appeared – there are now fourteen electricity and six gas distribution 
companies, though most of them still function as DSOs and supply entities. 
In the gas market, all six distribution companies are subsidiaries of PGNiG 
SA. The latter also largely controls the supply (sales) of gas to end-users, 
making it able to take actions against a competitive market. In addition, Polish 
authorities are delaying the liberalization of the gas sector until after the 
restructuralisation of the electricity sector. However, since the Commission 
did not foresee such a transitional period for the gas sector, it might yet start 
infringement proceedings against Poland under Article 226 TEU for the 
violation of the provisions of the Gas Directive. 
From the six gas distribution companies (dolnośląska, górnośląska, 
karpacka, mazowiecka, pomorska i wielkopolska), only one sales entity 
(Oddział Handlowy PGNiG) has been actually unbundled as of 1 July 2007. 
Still, even this company remains under the supervision of its mother company 
are available; iii) is not sufficient and appropriate tool to deliver the opening of the European 
markets and to reach objective of guaranteeing an adequate level of investment in the networks 
and fostering the integration of the internal market, iv)generates negative social consequences, 
although not specified what kind of; and v) will not have clear and positive consequences for 
grid investments and energy prices, as these are determined by other factors according to the 
eight, although again not specified what kind of factors.
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PGNiG SA. In theory, the six existing distribution companies became DSOs 
strongly connected to PGNiG SA. However, why was only one sales entity 
unbundled so far and why has it been placed under PGNiG supervision? 
Moreover, the six new DSOs are controlled by PGNiG SA, an arrangement 
that is anti-competitive and incompatible with the unbundling requirements 
of the Gas Directive. It is hard to believe that the Commission will overlook 
the fact that the distribution and sales segments of the Polish gas market, even 
though theoretically unbundled, are in practice still under the supervision and 
command of a single VIC. 
In comparison to the gas market, the distribution segment of the electricity 
market is more competitive. However, the level of dominance of PGE is 
still significant. Of the fourteen electricity distribution companies, only two 
(RWE STOEN and GZE SA25) are owned by foreign capital. The remaining 
twelve are to some degree dependent on the Polish Treasury and the former 
monopolist. In light of the derogation periods provided in the Electricity 
Directive (with respect to legal unbundling and the under-100,000 customer 
clause), it is possible to have distribution companies operate as both supply 
companies and DSOs. This solution has however negative consequences for 
market participants because it creates the impression that the interest of the 
supply company is convergent with the interests of DSOs. Such convergence 
increases the possibility of discrimination against access-seeking third parties, 
which, in turn, reduces competition. 
Furthermore, the Polish electricity market is currently in a state of transition 
with the management of the distribution companies often also responsible for 
the management of supply and distribution (network) activities. No separate 
premises or business structures – one for the DSO and another for the supply 
company – exist. Moreover, all distribution companies in Poland supply more 
than 100,000 customers in both the electricity as well as gas market. Thus, none 
meets the exception clause set in the Electricity Directive (less than 100,000 
customers) making it possible to postpone functional unbundling. All this 
might suggest that Poland has not actually managed to functionally un-bundle 
its electricity market. If so, that would suggest a violation of EU laws. 
Not surprisingly, the European Commission opened infringement proceed-
ings against Poland in April 200626. In its Letter of Formal Notice, the Com-
mission stated that Poland had either not begun legally unbundling or had not 
25 GZE SA (76,4% owned by Vattenfall) currently has been unbundled and the following 
entities have been created: Vattenfall Distribution Poland (GZE SA), Vattenfall Sales Poland 
(GZE Kontakt) and Vattenfall Heat Poland (EW SA).
26 See Memo/06/152 Infringement procedures opened in the gas and electricity market 
sector, by Member States. Brussels, 4 April 2006, and “Polska nie przestrzega prawa unijnego” 
Gazeta Prawna, 19.12.2006.
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sufficiently unbundled its DSOs in the gas and electricity market. Additionally, 
the Commission claimed that Poland did not notify its public service obliga-
tions in the electricity and gas markets and also maintained preferential access 
for some historical contracts in relation to electricity. The Commission decided 
on 18 September 2008 to send a reasoned opinion to Poland concerning the 
failure to fully implement the Gas Directive27 Since some of its provisions 
were indeed not transposed into the Polish legal system. The Commission 
decided however to limit the scope of its reasoned opinion to Poland’s failure 
to designate a storage system operator. A reasoned opinion is the last step of 
the infringement procedure before referral to the Court of Justice.
Several additional problems arise from the “Program for the Polish electro-
energy sector” policy adopted in 2006 by the Council of Ministers. On its basis, 
electricity distribution companies with network assets were grouped together 
with generators. As a result, four new energy giants were established. (i) The 
first vertically integrated conglomerate was set up under the name Polish 
Energy Group (Polska Grupa Energetyczna, PGE). It was created primarily 
on the basis of PSE SA, with an additional 85% stake of the largest Polish 
electricity generator (BOT Górnictwo i Energetyka SA), which was in turn made 
up of three electricity plants (Bełchatów, Opole, Turów) and two coalmines. 
Added was also: PGE-Energia SA, made up of a generation company (Zespół 
Elektrowni Dolna Odra) and four combined heat and power plants (CHP 
Rzeszów, CHP Wrotków, CHP Gorzów, and CHP Bydgoszcz) as well as eight 
distribution companies operating in the east and south of Poland (Łódzki Zakład 
Energetyczny SA, Zakład Energetyczny Łódź-Teren SA, Zakład Energetyczny 
Warszawa-Teren SA, Lubelskie Zakłady Energetyczne LUBZEL SA, Zakład 
Energetyczny Białystok SA, Rzeszowski Zakład Energetyczny SA, Zakłady 
Energetyczne Okręgu Radomsko-Kieleckiego SA, and i Zamojska Korporacja 
Energetyczna SA). (ii) The second conglomerate was named Tauron Polska 
Energia. It was established by merging Południowy Koncern Energetyczny 
(made up of five power plants, two CHP plants and two coal mines) with an 
electricity generator (Stalowa Wola) and two distribution companies (ENION 
and ENERGIA-PRO). (iii) The third energy giant, ENERGA, contains three 
power plants (Zespół Elektrowni, PAK, and Ostrołęka) and the distribution 
company Energia (formerly the group G-8 operating in northern Poland). (iv) 
Finally, the fourth conglomerate, ENEA, combined an electricity generator 
(Kozienice) and a distribution company (Enea). 
Chart 1 identifies the shares of the four VIC and the regions in which they 
operate in Poland.
27 IP/08/1374 Internal market in natural gas: the Commission sends reasoned opinion to 
Poland, Brussels, 18 September 2008.
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Chart 1. Consolidation of the electricity sector in Poland.
Source: Polish Energy Regulatory Office (Urząd Regulacji Energetyki, URE)
The creation of the energy giants might have been a good idea in theory, 
assuming that they would compete with each other on the domestic market 
and, potentially, also externally. In practice however, the compatibility of this 
change is put in doubt in light of the provisions of the Electricity Directive, 
as transposed into the Polish legal system, unless a number of legal issues are 
considered. 
The main problem associated with this reshuffle surrounds the issue 
of unbundling and, in particular, the need to ensure that generation and 
supply are separated from distribution and transmission. In other words, the 
conglomerate PGE would have to separate its network activities from its supply 
activities, while its eight distribution companies would have to become supply 
companies only rather than DOSs. Alternatively, they would have to divest 
their supply activities and become system operators only. For example, Zakład 
Energetyczny Warszawa-Teren SA does not currently fulfil the unbundling 
requirements. The company engages in generation, distribution and supply of 
electricity and heating. Moreover, it has around 815,000 customers and as such, 
it does not qualify for the “less-than-100,000-customer” derogation from the 
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unbundling requirement set out in the Electricity Directive. Other distribution 
companies from other conglomerates, such as ENION and ENERGIA-PRO, 
are in a similar position. Moreover, even though the unbundling requirement 
had not been fulfilled at that time, in late 2007, URE granted a distribution 
activities concession to all eight of PEG’s distribution companies28. Was 
URE’s decision based on political considerations or was it a naïve wish of the 
regulator hoping that the companies would have unbundled by 1 July 2007?
It is doubtful whether the consolidation of the energy sector under State 
auspices is the correct choice. In Poland, consolidation through administrative 
methods is a political, rather than a market-oriented, solution. It goes against 
the Commission’s ambitions to liberalize the continent’s energy markets, to 
offer consumers more choice and to lower gas and electricity bills. Whenever 
politicians intervene in the mechanism of the free market, they jeopardize 
its overall long-term economic outcome. That has certainly been the case in 
Poland. The Polish Government might not have enough human and financial 
resources to equally equip all four of its new energy giants in order to create 
potentially competitive players on the EU market. A general scarcity of 
capital and resources in different branches of the national economy might 
also negatively affect the energy sectors. In addition, domestic consolidation 
by administrative means might bring about either of two possible outcomes. 
It may have a positive impact on the conglomerates, or at least on some of 
their parts, by strengthening poorly performing companies within the group. 
In other words, their well performing elements might act as leverage for their 
weak elements. However, the opposite might be true instead whereby the 
poorly performing companies might slow down the development of the strong 
ones, thus lowering the value and competitiveness of the group overall. This 
would, in turn, lower the overall competitiveness of the group in the context 
of the internal market. 
Consolidation might indeed lead to greater cost savings or lower energy 
prices for consumers but only under the assumption that the group would 
become more efficient thanks to internal restructuring and better transparency. 
In this regard, privatization is the best route: consolidation makes sense only 
when accompanied by a sell of parts of the energy companies. At least partial 
privatisation would generate the capital and achieve the internal corporate 
resilience necessary to compete on EU markets. In defence of the energy 
companies, one might argue that the global financial crisis in general, and 
skyrocketing prices of wholesale gas and coal in particular has put them under 
great strain. In fact, it might have left them with no choice at all but to pass 
on their increasing costs to customers as well we to consolidate to increase 
28 See “Cztery firmy bez wydzielonej dystrybucji prądu”, Gazeta Prawna, 1 June 2007. 
Available also at: http://www.cire.pl/item,27919,1.html 
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capitalization. Consolidation might indeed enable them to weather the present 
crisis. In the long run however, it may prove to have a harmful influence on 
the competitiveness of the Polish energy sector. 
V. Energy market regulation and third party access
Regulation is commonly traced back to US industrial development and, in 
particular, to the railroad industry. Between 1840 and 1940, many independent 
agencies emerged whose members were appointed by the US President. The 
US President would not normally revoke these appointees before the end 
of their term in light of the concerns that presidential powers would grow 
excessively to the point of threatening the constitutional balance of power29. 
However, the idea of sector-specific regulation was not exclusive to the US. 
Its roots can also be traced back 19th Century England where the Parliament 
created an independent railway commission with limited legislative, rather 
than exclusively administrative, powers.
In contrast, the European continental model of regulation has not been 
burdened by the problem of a “checks and balances” system so important in 
the UK and the US30. Regulatory authorities were historically established so 
as to be functionally independent from political influences of presidents, prime 
ministers or ministers. They were intended to be impartial decision-making 
bodies without raising major constitutional concerns. However, in most EU 
countries, explicit constitutional provisions seem to exclude the possibility of 
establishing administrative bodies such as regulators not directly linked to 
the government or to a specific minister. For example, Article 146(3) of the 
Constitution of the Republic of Poland states that the Council of Ministers 
directs the activities of public administration. Similarly, the 1958 French 
Constitution is based on the idea that public administration is hierarchically 
subordinated to a Minister or to the Prime Minister. Article 20(2) of the 
French Constitution states that the government shall have at its disposal the 
apparatus of public administration. Article 20(3) notes that the government 
will answer to the French Parliament for its own actions as well as for the 
acts of its public administrators. Article 21 further prescribes that the Prime 
Minister must direct the activities of the government. It might be concluded, 
that the French Constitution prohibits the creation of independent regulatory 
29 On development of regulation see more G. Majone, Regulating Europe, Routledge, 
London 1996, p. 10.
30 For more on the history of regulation in Europe see W. Hoff, Polish energy regulation in 
its European setting, LKAEM Publishing House, Warszawa 2007, p. 86–88.
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agencies. However, the French Conseil Constitutionnel ruled in 1986 that 
Article 21 of the Constitution does not stand in the way of the Parliament 
assigning responsibility for establishing rules in a specified policy area to 
another public authority. That conclusion was based on the assumption 
that this was done within the framework of an act of parliament and for the 
purpose of implementing that act. The Conseil Constitutionnel also held that 
Article 20(2) would be violated only if the delegation of powers infringed 
essential aspects of governmental policy31. 
Different aims were pursued by regulation in differed countries. The pur-
pose of regulation in the UK and the US was not to promote competition per 
se, as it was in continental Europe, but rather to supervise network companies 
and their potentially monopolistic activities32. Such dissimilarity was linked 
to different ownership structures. In the UK and the US, network compa-
nies were from the outset largely privately owned. In continental Europe, the 
operation of the networks was entrusted to State owned energy undertakings, 
which in turn created legal and natural monopolies. In this regard, Poland’s 
approach to energy regulation and liberalization follows the continental model 
whereby the regulator in granted independence mainly to enhance its imparti-
ality in decision-making. Nonetheless, in line with the German model, regula-
tory functions are integrated into the Polish Ministry of Economy33. Statutory 
regulation is still a fairly new concept in Poland. As a result, no general legal 
framework or doctrinal consensus exists in relation to the question of how 
should regulatory agencies function in practice. The ongoing debate concerns 
the limits to the political independence of regulators as well as the scope of 
their powers. The trend is clear however: in spite of residual constitutional 
doubts and democratic concerns, independent regulators have become a nec-
essary component of effective governance in all industrialized countries. 
New market-oriented regulation for network industries requires an active 
national regulatory authority, independent from the influence of market players 
as well as from day-to-day governmental interference. The Polish energy regulator 
monitors network performance and regulates energy enterprises in order to secure 
the interests of final consumers and, at the same time, to ensure market stability34. 
However, the competences of URE changed considerably with Poland’s accession 
to the EU. Presently, it holds the position of a central authority of public admin-
istration. According to Article 21(2a) of the Polish Energy Act, the President of 
31 For more on this see  G. Majone, A. Surdej, “Regulatory Agencies…”, p. 7–8.
32 For more on the aim of regulation in different countries see W. Hoff, Prawny model 
regulacji sektorowej, Warszawa 2008, p. 26–38.
33 More on the regulatory functions of the URE and Ministry of Economy and its correlation 
see F. Elżanowski, Polityka energetyczna. Prawne instrument realizacji, Warszawa 2008, p. 84–94.
34 www.ure.gov.pl 
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URE is nominated by the Minister responsible for the economy (presently, the 
Minister of Economy) and appointed by the Prime Minister. Until 2006, the term 
in office of the President of URE was set for five years35. 
Unfortunately, the Act on State Human Resources and Senior Higher State 
Offices of 24 August 200636 removed the tenure of the URE President. By 
doing so, it eliminated one of the fundamental pillars ensuring its autonomy, 
violating in turn the independence requirement set out in the Electricity 
and Gas Directives. The Prime Minister can dismiss the URE President in 
one of the listed cases37: continued inability to perform his/her duties due to 
severe illness; grave violation of duty or criminal conviction. At first sight, it 
might seem that the law provides the regulator with sufficient independence 
from the government. However, the dismissal grounds are rather vague. 
With this change, the government acquired almost unlimited power to shape 
the structure of the regulatory system38. In practice, the autonomy of the 
regulator is therefore rather limited while political influence is significant. This 
should be perceived as a major step back for Poland on its road to creating 
an independent regulator. 
Several issues compromise the independence of the Polish energy 
regulator at this moment. The first major problem lies in the supervision 
over administrative bodies such as URE. The Ministry of Economy supervises 
its activities based on the Act on the Council of Ministers39. According to 
its Article 34a(1), the Minister may issue binding decisions directed to his/
her subordinate (dependent) agencies. In addition, Article 12 names the 
Minister of Economy as the chief administrative authority in charge of the 
energy policy. In practice therefore, all actions of URE must be compatible 
with governmental policy - URE must seek guidelines from the Ministry. As 
a result, the regulator is often under political pressure to act in favour of the 
incumbents (owned by the Treasury) or in favour of political considerations, 
rather than in favour of the market, for example, by approving inappropriate 
supply tariffs for gas or electricity (prices charged to end users). 
On the one hand, regulated prices may sometimes protect customers, for 
instance, in the period of transition to an open and competitive market40 or 
35 See Article 21(2a) of the Energy Act.
36 Journal of Laws 2006 No. 170, item 1271.
37 Article 12(5) of Act of 24 August 2006 on State Human Resources and Senior Higher 
State Offices of 24 August 2006
38 For more on his see Hoff W. (2007) Polish Energy Regulation in it European setting. 
LKAEM Publishing House, Warsaw p. 78–82.
39 Ustawa z dnia 8 sierpnia 1996 o Radzie Ministrów (Journal of Laws 2003, No 24, item 
199 with subsequent amendments. 
40 In transition periods towards well functioning competition the coexistence of regulated 
and market prices may be necessary to protect customers from potential abuse of dominant 
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when they are most vulnerable41. On the other hand, regulated prices are 
also a political instrument – when elections are in sight, politicians like to 
keep electricity and gas prices low. Unfortunately, market structure may suffer 
from price controls that should be declared a public service obligation. The 
free market cannot function if electricity prices are kept constant, despite 
rising costs of primary energy sources such as coal, oil or gas. On the gas 
market, low prices are hard to reconcile with such market factors as the 
need to move to more expensive supply sources such as LNG. As a result, 
regulated prices are a strong disincentive for investment in new generation 
capacity and alternative energy infrastructure, placing those who invest in 
renewable energy at a competitive disadvantage because it is more expensive 
than conventional energy production. Moreover, if regulated prices are not 
in line with the market, those suppliers that have no capacity to generate 
significant cost savings, or equivalent long-term contracts, will not be able to 
make competitive offers, which would cover their supply costs. 
Therefore, in a country like Poland, where long-term contracts are being 
slowly abolished, maintaining regulated prices is a dangerous step for the 
market. It would be justified to separate the regulator from the Ministry and 
entrust the Parliament with the power to supervise it. This idea is supported by 
the fact that the division of tasks between URE and the Ministry of Economy 
is currently quite vague. Seeing as it is unclear who is in charge of guarantying 
the functional unbundling of network system operators, neither entity seems 
to be responsible. However, considering that unbundling is a political issue, 
it requires a political solution. 
The second major problem concerning URE’s independence derives from 
the fact that the regulator is financed from the State budget. Its autonomy is 
endangered by the potential risk of abuse of power by the government in shaping 
the budget allocated to the authority. This problem might soon be resolved 
thanks to the third legislative package on EU Electricity & Gas markets, which 
proposes to give budgetary autonomy to national regulators. Furthermore, 
since the regulator had no say as to the government’s consolidation plans, as 
well as no authority to regulate cross-border issues, URE does not have the 
power necessary to intervene in the functioning of the market and to move it 
towards liberalization. 
positions. Unfortunately in practice the co-existence of regulated and market prices is clearly 
not a transitory measure e.g., France or Poland. Such scheme has been valid for many years 
and there are no clear indications that Member States with regulated prices intend to remove 
them and proceed towards market prices. 
41 However protecting vulnerable customers which fulfils requirements of public service 
obligations should not be confused with maintaining regulated energy prices for all categories 
of customers.
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The third issue impacting the independence of the energy regulator concerns 
the absence of transparency in URE’s relationship with the UOKiK. The two 
institutions must be separate and autonomous in their operations, especially 
in circumstances where both can claim jurisdiction such as abuse of market 
power or violations of suppliers’ rights in third party access. Electricity and 
gas markets, where many mergers and acquisitions fall under antitrust law, 
are in urgent need of a clear identification of the hierarchy of authority and 
responsibility between URE and UOKiK.
Third party access has been implemented in Poland through the regulation 
of access tariffs to the transmission and distribution networks. The question 
of whether customers really do have third party access is measured by the 
possibility of switching suppliers. In general, a high switching rate indicates 
that there is a high level of choice of suppliers or traders. If suppliers 
and traders have easy access to networks, it can be assumed that access is 
transparent and based on well-defined tariffs. If the percentage of customers 
switching suppliers is low, in other words, if customers remain with incumbent 
suppliers, it must be assumed that their regulated prices impede the entrance 
of new suppliers. According to the Commission’s Benchmarking Report of 
2004, only 7% of large customers switched suppliers in the Polish electricity 
sector42. In 2005, only around 20% of large industrial customers and less than 
1% of smaller businesses changed electricity suppliers43. The switching rates 
remained low with only a few very large users changing electricity suppliers in 
2006. Unsurprisingly, no gas customer has switched its supplier to date44 and 
it is doubtful that such switch will take place next year. 
As of 1 July 2007, there were 15.7 million electricity and 6.7 million gas 
customers eligible to change suppliers45. According to URE’s provisional 
statistics, only 63 industrial customers and 541 households changed their 
suppliers of electricity in 2007. Among the reasons contributing to low switching 
levels lies the fact that the switching procedure is costly and complicated 
involving: the need to balance rules set up by different DSOs; high costs of 
metering systems introduced by a number of distribution companies and; 
high equipment modernization costs. Switching is additionally obstructed by 
heavy administrative burdens such as the need for an expensive and complex 
expertise concerning access to the system for renewable energy in the case of 
42 http://europa.eu.int/comm/energy/electricity/report_2005/doc/trade_unions/12b_epsu_
psiru_report.pdf 
43 For more on this see European Commission, Report on Progress in Creating the Internal 
Gas and Electricity Market, SEC(2005) 1448.
44 See “New Gas Reserves Act gives...”, p. 18.
45 For more on this see Z. Żukowski, “Umowę dostawy energii będzie można wypowiedzieć” 
Gazeta Prawna of 15 June 2007.
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implicit (presumed) lack of capacity set by the operators. Customers are further 
deterred from switching by the lack of an automated customer information 
exchange system between suppliers and distributors. 
In comparison, at the end of 2006, approximately 50% of all customers 
(more than 50% of large industrial customers, more than 50% of small and 
medium businesses and 48% of all households) changed suppliers on the UK 
electricity market. On the gas market, entities other than the incumbent supply 
64% of all customers: more than 85% of large industrial customers, more than 
75% of small and medium businesses and 47% of homes46. These numbers 
place the UK energy sector among those with the highest switching rates in 
the EU.
VI. The shortcomings of market reforms
The shortcomings of the reforms of the national energy sector can be traced 
back to the fact, that competition in Poland is generally limited to vertically 
integrated suppliers that are part of former monopolists. Non-vertically 
integrated (“independent”) energy producers and suppliers have been largely 
excluded from the market and thus, from the benefits of liberalization. In 
consequence, vertically integrated incumbents divided the market among 
themselves – facing only minimal competition – significantly limiting customer 
choice. Therefore, even though all customers have the right to choose their 
supplier since 1 July 2007, their choice is in practice very restricted since 
suppliers are strongly linked to incumbent system operators, which hold the 
right to grant access to their networks. 
In the first part of 2007, only around 1.5% of electricity was purchased on 
a liberalized market and only 1.8 % of the volume of gas was purchased by 
entities other than the regional distribution companies owned by PGNiG47. 
This constraint does not apply to energy trading companies, which in theory 
could operate on a regional or national scale. In practice however, they do 
not do so because over 55%48 of all energy trading is blocked by existing long-
term contracts (LTC). Long-term contracts are an exception in competitive 
markets with adequate liquidity (e.g. the Scandinavian or UK electricity 
markets). Conversely, in less liberalized markets, companies are bound by 
long-term supply contracts which oblige them to receive all of their electricity 
46 Data collected during the stage at the European Commission DG TREN, Unit D-1.
47 See “New Gas Reserves Act...”, p. 18.
48 See the assumptions of the Ministry of Economy on long-term contracts available at: 
http://www.cire.pl/item,27821,1.html   
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or gas from the incumbents. Long-term supply contracts can create barriers for 
smaller firms that want to expand their sales or for potential competitors who 
want to enter the market. A dominant firm is thus likely to abuse its market 
position, in light of Article 82 EC, if it ties a substantial proportion of demand 
to obligatory purchases on a long-term exclusive basis49. Long-term contracts 
have generally the potential to prevent, restrict or distort competition. They 
are subject to scrutiny under EU competition rules. 
Poland has repeatedly, but so far unsuccessfully, tried to eliminate LTCs 
between electricity generators and PSE (acting as a single buyer), most of 
which were concluded in the later half of the 1990s. A new law on the recovery 
of stranded costs due to the cancellation of LTCs50 entered into force in August 
2007. A maximum of € 3.3 billion51 in compensation is offered to State owned 
and private electricity generators as an incentive for a voluntary cancellation 
of LTCs. If power producers do not take advantage of this voluntary scheme, 
they leave themselves open to sanctions by the Commission, which believes 
that LTCs distort competition.52 Compensation payments started in the second 
quarter of 2008 – all 13 State owned generators as well as several privately 
owned generators, such as Elcho (owned by CEZ), Zielona Góra and Kraków 
(owned by EDF), Połaniec (owned by Electrabel) and Nowa Sarzyna (owned 
by Ashmore Energy, formerly Enron), are expected to cancel their LTCs. 
A new law on LTCs envisages additional compensation of up to € 270 
million53 for gas-fired, combined heat and power plants signed before 1 May 
2004. Gas-fired CHP plants have higher variable costs flowing from take-or-
pay commitments for the supply of gas. Without extra compensation, gas-fired 
plants would be disadvantaged vis-à-vis coal-fired generators, which buy local 
coal under short-term contracts. Five CHP plants will be eligible for extra 
compensation (Zielona Góra, Nowa Sarzyna and three state owned companies: 
EC Gorzów, which is owned by PSE, EC Lublin and EC Rzeszów). 
The cancellation of LTCs is legally and practically logical and justifiable. 
They have a negative influence on competition and market liquidity creating 
49 See Case T-65/89 BPB v. Commission [1993] ECR II-389, para. 68.
50 Journal of Laws 2007 No. 130, item 905.
51 See Ministry of Economy Web page available at: http://www.mg.gov.pl/Wiadomosci/
Strona+glowna/kdt.htm  (visited 13 July 2007).
52 In this regard in November 2005 Commission used its competences under Article 226 
EC and asked Poland to deliver Reasoned Opinion regarding long-term contracts. Additionally 
in its decision C-17/03 of June 2005 ECJ (concerning preferential access given by the Dutch 
regulator to transport capacities, for imports resulting from long-term electricity supply 
contracts) considered that the existence of long-term contracts, even concluded before the 
entry into force of the electricity directive, does not justify any preferential treatment and as 
such  LTC are perceived discriminatory vis-à-vis other market players. 
53 “Poland’s power producers to terminate PPAs” (2007) 116 Energy in East Europe. 
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entry barriers and distorting the prices of final energy products. The mechanism 
is straightforward – compensation is being paid in quarterly, pre-payments 
spread over a period of several years. The payments are handled by a special 
body, the Manager of Accounts (Zarządca Rozliczeń), owned by the TSO 
PSE-Operator. The costs of the compensation will be borne by end users. 
A transitional fee will be added to their electricity bills replacing the current 
equalization fee. Compensation will be calculated based on the difference 
between revenues raised from the sale of the amount of electricity produced 
at market prices and estimated stranded costs. 
Although the cancellation of LTCs does not raise major legal issues, it has 
some negative economic consequences. Long-term contracts provide a financial 
guarantee for electricity generators seeking to invest in infrastructure – they 
were used to secure bank credits of around € 5.3 billion54 (about half of which 
has already been repaid) to finance the modernization of aging plants and 
the construction of new capacity. Additionally, LTCs serve as a guarantee 
for private investors seeking to invest in the energy sector. Assuming that 
there is a need for new nuclear generation capacity, or capacity based on 
renewable resources, the return on investment in the energy sector is very 
long. Finding potential investors is therefore difficult, especially since the 
necessary input would have to be substantial. Additionally, present global 
financial crisis is putting an extra strain on the whole of the world economy. 
The cost of a 2500 megawatt nuclear power plant would be around $7 billion 
(3 million per megawatt as opposed to 1 million per megawatt in a coal-fired 
power plant). Receiving a guarantee in the form of a LTC for the supply of 
electricity would help secure investment and sustain its rating. Because around 
60% of Polish infrastructure needs immediate upgrading, that extra security 
is important. Unfortunately, legal and business considerations are not always 
in sync – a lot depends here on the will of the banks to grant credits without 
the guarantee of a LTC.   
Another significant factor delaying the opening of the market, and thus the 
advent of effective competition, is the slowness of the privatization process. Some 
believe that energy companies should not be privatized at all. Considering that 
they are the backbone of the national energy sector, they fear that privatization 
might undermine the nation’s security in the energy field.55 The managers of 
the incumbents as well as their trade unions maintain that privatization will 
result in major job losses and negative consequences for the environment. Not 
surprisingly, the energy sector is overstaffed, inflating energy prices. The public 
still has a negative attitude toward privatization and liberalization.
54 “Poland’s power producers....”, op. cit. 
55 This is a very often mistake made by the politicians. In practice national security is achieved 
by the diversification of sources and supply routes and not by privatisation or consolidation.
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Economic indicators show that Poland’s energy demands greatly exceed 
the available supply. Its growing energy needs will require both domestic 
and foreign direct investment. Opening of the sector to private investment, 
considered to be a means of alleviating Poland’s energy shortage, is a steadily 
growing necessity rather than just one of the available options. Poland suffers 
from a long-standing lack of investments in production capacity as well as 
lack of upgrades, or even proper maintenance, of the electricity and gas 
transmission and distribution grids. 
The problem of ownership must also be emphasised. Privatisation plans for 
the electricity market started as early as 1997. However, they were abandoned 
for political reasons by the former government (in power from 2005–2007) 
which focused on consolidating existing State owned energy companies 
into large capital groups such as PGE or Enea. Only recently has the new 
government taken steps towards partial privatization of these energy giants. 
However, the preparations needed to float these companies on the stock 
exchange are not simple, especially when financial markets are in turmoil. To 
meet listing requirements, energy companies may need, among other things, 
to increase their capital. However, this is an issue they have to face anyway, 
considering the investment challenges they face. Although costly, the creation 
of new capacity is necessary to ensure Poland’s energy security. 
Partial privatization on the stock market may not necessarily translate into 
the necessary internal restructuralisation or improve business practices of 
energy companies. Despite public trading, they may still be subject to strong 
political influence that is not always in line with the market. In the future, 
a strategic investor might still take partial, or even complete, control over 
these entities. This outcome depends on the Ministry of Treasury which owns 
most of the energy sector. In order to attract potential strategic investors, the 
Polish government must reduce the risk associated with its current policies – it 
must significantly enhance transparency in government institutions and create 
a climate favourable to economic growth. The introduction of a policy that 
reflects the interests of investors and consumers is also a must. The sector also 
needs an independent regulator with the power to ensure affordable services 
for consumers. 
The political controversy surrounding privatization has put pressure on the 
government to retain State ownership of energy networks or energy network 
companies (system operators). On the one hand, State control might be justified 
not only from the strategic point of view but also from the competitive point of 
view. It makes it possible to set the conditions of access to the electricity grid/
gas network independently of commercial interests. However, assuming that 
the State continues to own a major share of infrastructure companies, it must 
not hold any stock in generation or supply companies. At the very least, it must 
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limit its participation in generation or supply companies to a level which does 
not allow it to exercise any influence over their operations. Such an approach 
would emphasize the necessary expansion of the energy infrastructure with 
respect to the security of supply. It would also achieve the objective of securing 
efficient operation and development of the infrastructure and the provision 
of equal access to the grids for all users. 
On the other hand, while State ownership of system operators might 
find justification in competition and strategic interests of the country, State 
ownership of supply companies cannot. Only privately owned supply companies 
are directly linked to customers and exposed to the free market and thus 
able to adapt to the market mechanism of demand and supply when setting 
electricity/gas prices. In this regard, Poland does not have adequate financial 
and human resources to equally equip all of its State owned energy giants. 
Thus, for the benefit of the market and consumers, supply companies should 
leave State hands. Where networks or network operators are bundled together 
with supply companies under State auspices, the problem of unbundling would 
arise. Monopolistic public entities would be tempted to abuse their favorable 
market position to discriminate against competitors.
VII. Conclusions
There are at last two possible scenarios Polish policy makers can follow 
in liberalizing its energy sector. One would involve the UK approach that 
encompasses: ownership unbundling, less market concentration, less public 
ownership and more private capital in the industry. The second scenario 
follows the continental model: more concentration and vertical integration 
and more State or public ownership in the energy field (for instance, the 
French model). These two widely diverging approaches reflect different energy 
consumption patterns, energy mixes, sources of supply and natural resources 
of various European countries. 
Three issues make it difficult to objectively measure which of the models 
is better. First, the process of market opening is far from complete. Second, 
the process started much earlier in the UK than in other EU countries 
– historical circumstances have thus given the UK an advantage over other 
regions. Third, the UK has adopted a model based on a political, legal and 
economic environment that has long since supported the accumulation of 
private capital and the pursuit of entrepreneurial initiative. In contrast, the 
French have successfully adopted an approach that has entailed a very strong 
role of the State. It is difficult to determine in the abstract whether one of 
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the models is better than the other. It is thus difficult to predict which model 
should be applied in Poland. 
From the Polish point of view, changing the structure of its energy markets 
(from State to private ownership), especially under heavy opposition from 
trade unions, is very difficult in political terms. With its history of a centrally-
planned economy and the nationalization of the energy sector, Poland is 
likely to find the French model easier to accept. This acceptance does not 
guarantee however that it would turn out to be the best economic choice for 
the national energy sector. In this regard, Poland’s and France’s experiences 
are very different. Whereas France has long since exposed its State owned 
entities to competition in the EU and the global market (with moderate State 
interventionism), Poland has persistently protected its socialist economy from 
market forces. For years, it was irrelevant whether State owned companies 
were profitable or not. The lack of a capable, market-tested private sector in 
general, has delayed the development of Poland’s electricity and gas markets 
in particular. In the opinion of the author, the lack of a competent industry 
“owner” (far more knowledgeable about the particularities of the sector than 
the State) severely impacted its development.
If the French model is somewhat problematic for Poland so too is the UK 
model. The latter is likely to be the better option because both its electricity 
and gas markets have been fully open since 1998, as a result of the liberalization 
process that started in the late 1980s. What characterises the UK model is that: 
price controls are removed; customer-switching rates are among the highest 
in the EU; market concentration is relatively low; the ownership of gas and 
electricity transmission companies is unbundled and thus, there is no incentive to 
discriminate among market players and; finally, that competition is considered 
to be effective. Particularly the English and Welsh markets appear to have 
become much more competitive since the late 1990s. The sector in general 
has become more efficient and customer bills have fallen (some of the lowest 
energy prices in the EU). The research of Joskow56 suggests that structural, 
regulatory and market reforms like those in the UK have significantly improved 
the condition of the energy companies – once State owned monopolies that 
have underwent an effective privatisation process. The latter, together with 
a mechanism to regulate distribution companies, has generated significant 
cost-savings overall, without compromising service quality. Wholesale markets 
have also stimulated improved performance among existing generators and 
facilitated major investments in new energy-generating capacity. Although the 
outcome of the liberalization of the UK energy sector has been satisfactory, 
the radical political and economic transformation, from which it originates and 
56 P. Joskow, Lessons Learned From Electricity Market Liberalization (2008) The Energy 
Journal, Special Issue. The Future of Electricity: Papers in Honor of David Newbery. 
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which began in the Margaret Thatcher era, would be very difficult to apply in 
Poland. Although Thatcher’s policies might not have benefited everyone, she 
ensured that the UK economy has not become a socialist welfare-state such 
as Germany or France. This is especially noticeable in the energy sector, with 
its high rate of employment (not to say over-employment). 
One has to wonder therefore whether it would be possible to somehow 
foster in Poland the results of UK liberalization process? Alternatively, would 
it be possible to apply a conjunction of the two models? The answer is, to 
some extend, yes. Consolidation through administrative means, as conducted 
in Poland, goes against the Commission’s spirit of liberalization. However, it 
could succeed in the long run if followed by privatization (through the stock 
exchange or through private ownership by a strategic investor and, if necessary, 
partial government ownership) which would lead to internal restructuring of 
the energy conglomerates. Paradoxically, privatization needs strong support 
from the government. Unfortunately, the government’s seemingly strong liberal 
approach towards the reform of the energy sector is threatened by the negative 
attitude towards privatization in general, and unbundling in particular, of the 
trade unions and the two energy giants PGNiG and PGE. The workforce 
and the companies themselves are indeed very influential stakeholders in this 
debate, allegedly able to successfully lobby the government and to affect the 
formation of economic policy. 
Literature
“Cztery firmy bez wydzielonej dystrybucji prądu” [“Four firms without a separation of 
electricity distribution”] Gazeta Prawna, 1 June 2007.
Elżanowski F., Polityka energetyczna. Prawne instrument realizacji [Energy Policy. Legal 
Instruments of Its Implementation], Warszawa 2008. 
European Commission, Report on Progress in Creating the Internal Gas and Electricity 
Market, SEC(2005) 1448.
European Commission Staff Working Document. Implementation Report – SEC(2006) 
1709, page 136. Accompanying document to the Communication from the Commission 
to the Council and the European Parliament – Prospects for the internal gas and 
electricity market – COM(2006) 841 final. Available at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/energy/energy_policy/doc/10_internal_market_country_reviews_en.pdf
Goldberg S., “Recent developments in the European Union energy sector” (2008) 
European Energy Review published by Herbert Smith LLP in association with Gleiss 
Lutz and Stibbe.
Hoff W., Prawny model regulacji sektorowej [The Legal Model of Sector-specific Regulation], 
Warszawa 2008.
YEARBOOK of ANTITRUST and REGULATORY STUDIES
168  BARTŁOMIEJ NOWAK
Hoff W., Polish energy regulation in its European setting, LKAEM Publishing House, 
Warszawa 2007.
Joskow P., “Lessons Learned From Electricity Market Liberalization” (2008) The Energy 
Journal, Special Issue. The Future of Electricity: Papers in Honour of David Newbery 
IAEE.
Majone G., Surdej A., “Regulatory Agencies in Economic Governance. The Polish case 
in a comparative perspective” (2006) 5 KICES working papers, Koszalin Institute of 
Comparative Administrative Studies. 
Majone G., Regulating Europe, London 1996.
“New Gas Reserve Act gives PGNIG even stronger control over the Polish market” (2007) 
Gas Matters, Platts.
Nowak B., “Rozdział przedsiębiorstw zintegrowanych pionowo w sektorze energii elektrycznej 
i gazu na podstawie Dyrektyw Elektroenergetycznej i Gazowej” [“Separation of Vertically 
Integrated Undertakings in Electricity and Gas Sector Based on Electricity and Gas 
Directives”] (2007) 8 Przegląd Ustawodawstwa Gospodarczego.
Nowak B., Wewnętrzny Rynek Energii w Unii Europejskiej [Internal Energy Market in the 
European Union], Warszawa 2009.
Olejnik M., “National Approaches to implementation – Poland” [in:] Cameron P. (ed.), 
Legal Aspects of EU Energy Regulation. Implementing the New Directives on Electricity 
and Gas Across Europe, Oxford University Press 2005.
“Poland’s power producers to terminate PPAs” (2007) 116 Energy in East Europe. 
Roggenkamp M., “Gas Liberalization in the Netherlands: Ownership Unbundling and the 
Reorganization of Gasunie” [in:] Hammer U., Roggenkamp M. (eds.), European Energy 
Law Report III, Intersentia, Antwerpen-Oxford 2006.
Skoczny T., “Państwowe monopole handlowe w prawie wspólnotowym” [“State Monopolies 
of Commercial Character”] (1997) 3 Studia Europejskie.
Skoczny T., “Energetyka” [“Energy Industry”] [in:] Barcz J. (ed.), Prawo Unii Europejskiej. 
Prawo Materialne i Polityki [European Union Law. Substantive Law and Policies], 
Warszawa 2003.
Szydło M., “Unbunbdling własnościowy (ownership unbundling) jako instrument regulacyjny 
w sektorze energetycznym (część I)” [“Ownership Unbundling as an Instrument of Regu-
lation in Energy Sector (Part I)”] (2007) 2 Przegląd Ustawodawstwa Gospodarczego.
Szydło M., “Unbunbdling własnościowy (ownership unbundling) jako instrument regula-
cyjny w sektorze energetycznym (część II)” [“Ownership Unbundling as an Instrument 
of Regulation in Energy Sector (Part II)”] (2007) 3 Przegląd Ustawodawstwa Gospo-
darczego.
Taylor S., “Energy unbundling faces switch-off” European Voice 14–21 June 2007. 
Żukowski Z., “Umowę dostawy energii będzie można wypowiedzieć” [“Energy Supply 
Contract Can be Terminated”],  Gazeta Prawna 15 June 2007.
